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Petitioner was convicted in a Delaware trial court of first
degree rape, second degree kidnapping and first degree burglary.I
Petitioner appealed his convictions to the Delaware Supreme
Court, contending that the trial court erred in refusing to hear
testimony at the suppression hearing which would have attacked
the truthfulness of the affidavit 2 underlying the search warrant
upon which evidence had been seized. 3 The Supreme Court of
Delaware affirmed the convictions, holding that no challenge may
be made to the veracity of an affidavit upon which probable cause
for the issuance of a search warrant had been founded. 4 The United
States Supreme Court reversed and held that when a criminal
defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that intentional
or reckless misstatements, necessary to a finding of probable cause,
were made by the affiant in a search warrant affidavit, the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution mandates that an
evidentiary hearing be held at the defendant's request. Franks v.
Delaware, __ U.S. -, 98 S.Ct. 2674 (1978).
1.Frankssv. Delaware.
_U.S.-,
98S. Ct. 2674 (1978).
2. The affidavit is reprolduced at __U.S.
at__
98 S. Ct. at2685-87 app. A.
3. Franks v. State. 373 A.2(1 578. 579 (Del. 1977). On Marh 5. 1976. Mrs. Cynthia Bfailcv
ion of the
and gave he poli e a (h'sci(pt
assauhed
recported to the police that she had been sexuallV
assailant and the clothing he had worn. The same day. petitioner. while awaiting a hail hearing for
a n Unrlated assault involving a Brenda B.
. indicated to a vouth offlitcr that he
thought the hearing was about Bailey rather than Brenda B _
.
When the offiicr
subseqluently happened to mention the incident toa dcc(tivc, Brooks. the in',segatin ofthe' Baile'
assauIt focused on petitioner. On March 9th, Bailc.' and anothcr dIlietcits
subitid a swi rn
affidavit
in application for a swarrant to search petitioner's aparmiient forccriain discribed dlothing
and a knife. The affidavit, on the basis of which a searh \\arrant %%as issued and ari lcssimilar it)
those lescribed \\ere found. stated that the affia'nt had been told b i,\o prsonsii the vonh (cntr
wheire petitioner sworked that petitioner often wore clothing likithat dcs ribid by ihi' \ ixtim. At a
stppir'ssion hearing before trial. petitioner's attoriey conti'nde that thi'
scan h wairrant did not on
its fice slhoss probable causc and orally amended his challinge to inch', an attack on thi' s 'raiitv of'
the afidias it. Defense cotunsel asserted that the two persons alh'gc'dly
i on.iitd b
Brooks ,s'told
tcstil\ thai dis did not tilk to Brooks. but that this ntay hasi talked to anothir ilic' iffici'r.
In
addition. they woul testifs that wshatthe' toldth officci
%as "sotnisshat diffiercnt" from wshatwas
statcd in thi'iffidavit. Th prOsCCL ution's 1objitiin t li'cs cra its i hallenge ati'nipt s'as sustainid b
the trialourt. -U.S.
it _
. 98.S. Ct. it2677-79.
4.373 A.2da579-80.
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The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
assures the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures and provides that "no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation. . . "5
In 1914, the United States Supreme Court established the rule that
a defendant's constitutional rights are denied by a denial of his
petition before trial for return of property secured through an
illegal search or seizure conducted by federal authorities. 6 The
exclusionary rules thus established was held applicable to the states
by the Court's holding that "all evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution was inadmissible in a state
court. 7 The United States Supreme Court has established the rule
that "[u]nder the [f]ourth [a]mendment, an officer may not
properly issue a warrant to search a private dwelling unless he can
find probable cause therefor from facts or circumstances presented
to him under oath or affirmation." 8 Whether, and under what
circumstances, a criminal defendant has the right to challenge the
veracity of the facts or circumstances presented in an application
for a search warrant is an issue that, prior to the opinion in Franks,
had not been decided by the United States Supreme Court. This
issue had been a subject of conflict in both the state and federal
courts. 9

Early cases held that a defendant is not entitled to go behind
the search warrant and attack the affidavits upon which probable
cause had been founded.' 0 At the time of the Franks decision all of
the federal circuit courts of appeal, except one, had allowed
veracity challenges."' The state courts, however, had been more
12
divided on the issue.
5. U.S. CONST. aloCnd. IV.

6.Weeks v. United States. 232 U.S. 383. 398 (1914).
7. Mapp v. Ohio. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
8. Nathanson %. United States. 290 U.S.41. 47 (1933).
9. - U.S. at - , 98S. Ct. at 2679.
10. Kenne v. United States. 157 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1946): United States %. Burnett, 53 F.2d
219, 225 (W.D. Mo. 1931). In Kenney, the court stated that a warrant upon which evidence was
seized leading to a conviction of operating a lottery and possessing materials therefore was sufficient
if the affidavit s hows ed probable cause at the time the warrant was issued. 157 F.2d at 442. The Court
in urtrno'l stated that [the 'probable cause' required by the fourth amendment is that shossn by an
affidavit." 53 F.2d at 225.
11. _
U.S. at _
+ 98 S. Ct. at 2678-79 n.4. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Couitlbia had riot allosed veracity challenges. Sec United States s. Branch. 545 F.2d 177. 180 n.2

(1976).
the states at
12. _
U.S. at _
. 98 S. Ct. at 2687-89 app. B. The appendix lists the status of"
challenges. According to the appendix.
the titte of, tie opitnion ni tihe issue of per mtitting veracitsy
ltirteen states per lit cracitv challenges. as opposed io tsstele
hich do not. The practice of four
ithet states ima beh ased onl statute. The Court lists tso other states \ hich ma\ permit challenges
and listssix stat's wsich avoided rdretrining the issue oi various groundrs. The Court also mentions
Mwo states wsich ha e prohibiited challenges that

wsereseelningis directed against the croolusorv
Cotirt of North Dakota has not

nature of tile aifidas its ralthau
than their \ eiacits.Id.
Tilt Sipriie
decided the issie.
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A leading case which held that no veracity challenge may be
made was State v. Petillo. 13 In Petillo, the defendant appealed his
conviction on gambling charges, contending that the trial court
should have granted his motion to suppress evidence obtained
under a search warrant because facts in the affidavit upon which
probable cause was founded were false. 14 The NewJersey Supreme
Court held that the truth of factual assertions contained in affidavits
submitted in support of an application for a search warrant may not
be controverted in a subsequent motion to suppress evidence. 15
In support of its holding, the court in Petillo concluded that the
fourth amendment's probable cause requirement for the issuance
of a search warrant is met "if ajudicial mind decides that the sworn
factual allegations set out in the affidavit or testimony sworn to
before him show the required probable cause." 16 The Petillo court
reasoned that the judge is trusted to evaluate the credibility of the
affiant and the legal sufficiency of the facts to which the affiant
swears. 17 The court also pointed out that sufficient deterrence of
perjury exists because the officer must swear to the testimony and is
subject to perjury, contempt charges, and civil suit. 18 Furthermore,
the added burden placed on the judicial system from allowing
veracity challenges would surpass any protective value, especially
since adequate deterrence already exists and the question of guilt or
innocence is not being determined. 19
Most of the courts which have decided to allow veracity
challenges have dealt perfunctorily or not at all with the issue of
why veracity challenges must be allowed. 2 0 These courts quickly
13. 61 N.J. 165,293 A.2d 649 (1972).
14. Id. at__,
293 A.2d at 651. The affidavit stated in part that the officer had dialed a phone
number listed in defendant's name and an informant then placed bets. At the suppression hearing,
defendant was allowed to present as a witness a phone company emplovee who testified that the
phone number had been changed and if the officer had dialed that nutmber. he wNould hase been
answered bv an intercept operator. The employee admitted that it might hae been possible for
defendant to have overcome the intercept. After the suppression hearing, the trial court denied
defendant's motion to suppress, finding no prejury was committed and probable cause existed. Id.
15. Id. at__,
293 A.2d at 653. The NewJersey Supreme Court held that the trial court should
not hase allowed any challenge to the affidavit at the suppression hearing. The defendant was
granted a writ of habeas corpus by the New.Jersey federal district court in United States ex rel Petillo
v. State of New.Jersey. 400 F. Supp. 1152 (D.N.J. 1975). The district court held that defendant was
denied due process because he did not receis e a full and fair hearing in state ourt. Id at 1188.
16. 61 N. at _.
293 A.2d at 653.
17. Id.
18 Id, at_
293 A2d at 653-54.
19. Id at__. 293 A.2d at 655-56.
20. Herman. lgarrantsfor Arrest or Search Inpeaching thr Allegations nfa Factallt Ssffent Affidavit,
36Otto ST. L. J 721 (1975). Herman states that "cases that permit a sub-ft ial attack are about as
poorly reasoned as cases prohibiting it." Id. at 728. Herman deals thoughtfullv and at length with
fourth amendment rationales for requiring sub-facial \%arrant (hallcnges. See Forkosh, The
Constituhional Ri ht to Challenge thr Control ofAffidasits in lVarrantv Issued Under the Fourth Amendment. 34
OHIO ST. L.1. 297 (1973) for a discussion. with special emphasis on the history of the fourth
amendment. of the constitutional issues ins ols ed in search warrant veracits s hallenges.
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moved on to questions of when the challenges were to be allowed
and what form the challenges were to take. 2' In support of allowing
veracity challenges, one court reasoned that the obvious
assumption behind the fourth amendment requirement of a factual
showing sufficient to comprise probable cause was that the showing
would be truthful. 2 2 Courts often argued that allowing sub-facial
attacks on warrants were necessary for the deterrence of official
23
misconduct.
In allowing veracity challenges, the courts must also decide
under what circumstances alleged misrepresentations require the
invalidation of search warrants based on such false affidavits.
Generally, the courts agree that some initial showing of falsity in
the affidavit must be made before a defendant would be entitled to
a hearing to decide whether falsity actually existed. 24 There has
been more disagreement by the courts on the issue of the
circumstances, once falsity has been proven, which entitle a
defendant to suppression of evidence. Two major differing
positions on the issue had been developed by the federal circuit
courts of appeal.
In United States v. Carmichael,25 the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit announced the rule that any deliberate
government perjury, even if immaterial to the establishment of
probable cause, mandates the suppression of evidence seized upon
the perjured search warrant.2 6 Furthermore, if the falsity is
material, reckless error shall mandate suppression, but mere
negligent or innocent mistake, even if material, will not.2 7 The
court reasoned that innocent errors do not justify suppression
because no deterrent purpose is served and reasonable error does
not negate probable cause. 28 The Carmichael court could find no
21. Sir. . United States ..Marihart. 492 F.2d 897. 899-900)(8th Ci. 1974). art. dr'nid. 419
U.S. 827 (1974): United States v. Carmichael. 489 F.2d 983. 988-89 (7th Cir. 1973).
22. United States v. Halsev. 257 F. Supp. 1002. 1005 (S.D. N.Y. 1966).
23. Se. r.. United States v. Belcitfiinc. 508 F.2d 58. 63 (1st Cir. 1974). Courts often argue that
lite e\ part I;rttli ' t le s il'llt-iSSttill,
i pili('dLu e ilteases the Ilecessitv
of'd lerten'te IlleaStlles,
-iowex er. as Fletllll points out. veracity chiallcige ritionalt's Iase'd upon teIci 'ing
(F
fiiil
I)iscttduict i I)yciiiplo\
ing the exctlusioniarv rtllofteln
iss a step itt their atnah sis. The exCIsixitnar\"
rule and IlitC dlee
ti

ll
iit'

iiille should nit

iiollteinto play untilti

lburth tllnllndinent \ iilatiom has

first
h'tn sitiblish ld.
Ficrinan. supra note 21 at 728-29.
2-4. S,'.
United States v. Carmnichael. 489 F.2d at 989: United States . Halscv. 2.57 F.
Stipp. at 1006.
25. -189 F.2d 911:1(7th Cir. 1973). The standards sctout in Cartit' had itv hecn adptcd hb.[\\o
tt r kirci
il il is.So Unitcd States x. lee. 540 F.2d 1205. 1209 (-filt Cir. 1976). serf. deieihd. 429
U.S. 89-1(1076): Uinitd Sticxs . MN iihart. 192 F.2d 897. 900 (8th Cir. 1i7-1).
rrf. ditd.
419 U.S.
827 (107 1).Thc Coui t ol'.\p
slW
s I'mithe Sixth Circuit i s aplar tly 1ad i el'dit' s it Standards.
1
ttitcd Statics
\ I.ti:i. :)2iF.2 14.8 (6th Cii. 19771.
'it.
dniisd. 42-1 U.S. 65(19 761.
26. 489 F.2d at 989.
27. Id.;i988-89.
28. Id. "If an agent reasonably believes facts which on their face indicate that a crime has
lpro
lyha
lkr't' llllllillt'l,
led.
l tici
\ en it' llist~ikt'n+hic has problahhb ;ll llto
chlic\cv that :1 crlillit. hals
lit'Ill
c'tlnnllittt'd.
" /d. at (081.
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workable test to distinguish between innocent and negligent
mistake, therefore, it concluded that negligent error, whether
material or not, should not mandate suppression. 29 However, the
court found that where deliberate perjury has occurred, "[t]he
fullest deterrent sanctions of the exclusionary rule should be applied
to such serious and deliberate government wrongdoing. "30
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reached somewhat
different conclusions in United States v. Thomas. 31 The Thomas court
held that affidavits containing misrepresentations are invalid if the
error is material or the deception Was intentional on the part of the
agent-affiant. 32 Therefore, the Thomas court reached the same
conclusion as Carmichaelin that any intentional deception mandates
suppression. 33 The Thomas decision, however, differed from
Carmichael in that Thomas allowed suppression when any falsity,
34
even innocent error, is necessary to a finding of probable cause.
In order to reconcile the conflicting views of the lower courts,
the United States Supreme Court in Franks addressed the issue of
the effect of affidavit falsity on suppression attempts.3 5 In finding
that under some circumstances veracity challenges must be
allowed, the Franks court concluded that when a defendant makes a
substantial preliminary showing that a false statement, necessary to
the finding of probable cause, was intentionally or knowingly
included by the affiant in a search warrant affidavit, the fourth
amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant's
request. 36 The Court limited its holding to misrepresentations by
by
misrepresentations
excluding
affiants,
warrant
nongovernmental informants. 37 Furthermore, before a defendant is
29. Id. The court recognized that negligent misrepresentations are theoretically dctcrrabl.
Herman. arguing that the innoenee-negligence line is cormninlyv drawn il ivil litigation. disagreed
that a workable test for separating innocent and negligent error -otuli not he found. Hermntan, illpro
note 20 at 750.

30. 489 F.2d at 989. The Court of Appeals for (he First Cirtcuit evidently tn'ploys a slightly
f
r
tifferint standard. That court stated that it saw "no supportable alternative to suppression
e\idence obtained pursuant to a \\ arrant based on an altidax'it containing an intentional. riIvant. and
non-trivinr misstatement." United States v. Belculfine. 508 F.2d at 63 (emphasis addet). Thus. the
Be/trfinre court. unlike the Carmichael court. stated that even deliberate perjur rtu

st hIe relevant and

non-trivial iri order to mandate suppression.
31. 489 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1973). cert. denied 423 U.S. 844 (1975).
32. Id. at 669.
33. Id.
34. Id
98S. Ct, at 2679.
35. __U.S. at __.
iitrncer's orfferrf
. 98 S. Ct. at 2676-77. Because the tria coitt (Iili nt 'xtttititln p
36. Id. art _
proof. the Court remanded the case to allow then to do so. The Court stated that "Islinee the
v
ours+'l,.'s
fraiin orf suitable ruIles to goern proffers is a matter prop erly It.fto t hi Statrs. ,.,.r'<ilint
. 98 S d. at 268.5. Ncertheless. the Court did set forth
d. at __
to passo l p'titione'r's proffer."
sereitl standardsx which such proffers should ncet, in partiiular. the allrgattirns of intertional or

reckl'ss falsehood should speCtificlily point out the portion of the affidax it ('laimcd to r

false and

or thrr reliatl'
should hr atio panlied ly sup~tttrting reasons and ,rffid;avits. sxorn srti'nnrs
sta
ei'nits of'itri'sscs. oran adeqtlrrtr' explanatio for the absen+ce ofstlrh r'stimonx. Id.
37. d. The Court disCuiss'd Rurgndorfv. United States. 376 U.S. 528 (1964). which dclt with
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entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his allegations of falsity, the
content remaining in the affidavit after the alleged falsity is set to
one side must be insufficient to support a finding of probable
cause. 3 8 The majority in Franks also considered what standard is to
be utilized at the suppression hearing once the defendant has made
a satisfactory offer of proof.3 9 The Supreme Court concluded that
the defendant must establish the falsity by a preponderance of the
evidence.

40

The Supreme Court's reasoning in allowing veracity
challenges appears to have consisted of two major premises. First,
the Court found that the language of the Warrant Clause of the
fourth amendment is premised upon the affiant's good faith. 4' The
Court pointed out that probable cause is based on a truthful
showing4 2 and material in the affidavit "is to be 'truthful' in the
sense that the information put forth is believed or appropriately
accepted by the affiant as true. "g4
The Court's second major premise was that in order for the
fourth amendment's probable cause requirement to be effective,
the deterrents of veracity challenges and suppression of evidence
must be allowed in some situations.4 4 The Court found that the
search warrant application hearing before a magistrate, because of
its ex parle and often urgent nature, is not adequate to discourage or
discover lawless and reckless misconduct. 45 Furthermore, if no
alleged search warrant affida it falsity. In Rtsendorf the Court held that the dceendant's claim that
craii doulble hearsay statements made by law enforcement agents were false would not destroy
probable cause because the statements did not go to the integrity of the warrant. Id. at 532. The
Court in Franks stated that "liln characterizing the affidavit in Rugendorf as raising no question of
integrity. the Court took as its premise ihat police could not insulate one officer's deliberate
tisstateient merely by relaying it through an officer-affiant personally ignorant of its falsity." Id. at
. 98 S. Ct. at 2680-81 n.6. Thus, it appears that information supplied to the affiant by other law
enfi cettent officers mas be subject to a Veracity challenge under the Franks guidelines.
38. Id. att.
98 S. Ct. at 2685.

39. Id. at

98 S. Ct. at 2677.

40. Id. The Court stated the following:
In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is
established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the
alfclta it 's false iratcrial set to one side. the affidavit's remaining content is insufficient
to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the
search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the
affildavit.
Id.
41. Iat_
, 98 S. Ct. at 2681.
42. Id.. citing United States v. Halsey. 257 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
43.
-U.S.
at __
, 98 S. Ct. at 2681. The dissent reached a different conclusion on the
warrant requirement. arguing that "[ill the function of the warrant requirement is to obtain the
deteriimijot of a neutral riagistrate as to whether sufficient grounds have been urged to support
tie issuance of i warrant. that function is fulfilled at the time the magistrate concludes that the
requireent has been met." d. at _
. 98 S. Ct. at 2689. (Rehnquist. J.. Burger. C. .. dissenting).
44. Id- at
.98 S. Ct. at 2683-84.
45. Id. at
. 98 S. Ct. at 2683. The dissent. acknowledging that not every determination of
the iiagistra(Lt will necorrect. concluded as follows:
Ui]Inlesswe are to exaltas tile Il, phis u/ira of our system of criminal justice the absolute
ciirrtCness Of e\VI factial determination made alon" the tortuous route from the
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veracity challenges were permitted, police officers intent upon
obtaining a search warrant would have little to lose by lying to
46
magistrates, and everything to gain if the ploy went undetected.
The Court in Franks engaged in little discussion of the reasons
behind the specific requirements it set forth which the defendant
must meet in order to receive a hearing and be granted evidentiary
suppression. 47 Prior to the decision in Franks, the courts and
commentators had disagreed on whether to require the defendant
to make a substantial preliminary showing of falsity.4 8 In addition,
disagreement existed as to whether suppression was required when
the affidavit contained reckless, material misstatements while
suppression would not be required for negligent, material
misstatements. 49 Also, the courts which have allowed veracity
challenges generally reached a different conclusion than Franks on
the priority of requiring suppression when the affiant makes
50
intentional but immaterial misstatements.
Two issues in particular were left to be decided after Franks.
The Court stated that the statements which are allowed to be
impeached in accordance with the holding in Franks are only those
of the affiant, not of any nongovernmental informant. 51 Thus, the
issue of whether and when a defendant may challenge the veracity
of statements made by nongovernmental informants, which are
filing of the complaint or the issuance of an indictment to the final determination that a
,iudcment of conviction was properly obtained. we shall lose perspct ive as to the
purposes of the s\ystem as well as of the warrant requirement of the Iflourth and
[qonrtienth [a] m end meonts
Id. at__.
98S. Ct. at 2689 (Rehnquist.,J.. dissenting).
46. Id. at _.
98 S. Ct. at 2683. The Court in Franks noted that "alternaltixe sanctions of a
perjury prosecution, administrative discipline, contempt, or a civil suit are not likely to fill the gap."
Id. at __
98 S. Ct. at 2684.
47.
_US.__
98 S. Ct. 2674.
48. So-. r... United States v. Beltufine. 598 F.2d at 63. United States v. Halsey. 257 F. Supp, at
1006: Herman, supra note 20 at 759. Herman argued hat a prceduhral rule requiring a preliminary
showing woul

effectivelv bar sub-facial atacks

in moist

case-s

because

the

demonstration sif

misrepresentation "cannot fieasibl be itade without coMducting a 'fishing' interrogation of the
info mant or aflianti" who would be unlikely to cooperate voluntarily. Herman. supra note 20 at 759.
The court in Be/ciifinr stated that because an initial showing of intentional falsity presumably could
not he made easily in most cases, it saw little danger to the warrant process from frecIltent challenges
of intentional misstatements. 508 F.2d at 63.
49. See.r.', United States v. Carmichael. 489 F.2d at 988-89: Herman. supra note 20 at 745-50:
Kipperman. Inaccurate Search ItarrantAfidaiits as a Groundfr Suppressin.e Evidence. 84 HAR,. I. REv.
825. 831-32 (1971).
50. Soc, r.g . United States v. Thomas. 489 F.2d at 669: United States v. Carmichael. 489 F2d
at 989, Th- Breufinc c0rt. Which stated that suppression should be allowed for intentional. noniri\ial misstatements, argue(] as follows:
\\'ere the judicial response to be ntrely the elimination rftle false statements and the
assessment of the affilavit's adequacy in the light of the remaining aserments.
tunfroi1ietYTn offif-iS sOUldl

he placed in It- sintoxsaid positio

if

having -\secthing

gain and nothing to lise in strengthening an itihi-ris marginal affidav it bv
their intense dedicatio
ctoduty Nir hi distinctiim btwein fact and fanlas\.
508 F,2d at 63.
51. __ U.S. t

.98S

C . ;t 2685.

to

ltting
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relied upon to find probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant, was not answered by the Court.52 In addition, the Court
did not decide whether the identity of an informant must be
revealed once a prelimillary showing of falsity has been made.53 As
noted in Franks,5 4 the Court's earlier decision on informant identity
disclosure held only that the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth
amendment did not require the disclosure of an informant's
identity routinely, upon the defendant's mere demand, when
ample evidence existed at the probable cause hearing to show the
informant reliable and the information credible. 55 Therefore, it is
unclear whether the informant's identity must be revealed when the
veracity of the affidavit has been preliminarily challenged
successfully .56
The Franks decision was the first Supreme Court decision to
permit criminal defendants to challenge the veracity of material
included by affiants in search warrant affidavits. 5 7 However, since
the Court established strict requirements which must be met before
evidentiary hearings and evidence suppression are mandated, 5 it is
unlikely that the courts will be overwhelmed by a large increase of
veracity challenges and hearings.
/
DAVID'BIRK

52. Id. Tie Court found the wxarran! requirement of tile fo trth ami'ndne0 to hav e been
'
xiolatctI in Franks bctause (i the lack of a "trutful
I
slinwing.
The Court stated that it meant
truthful "in tt sense tha the iinforiation It forth is believed or appropriately accepted hi the efiant
as tritc." Id at _.
98 S. Ct. at 2681.(emphasis added).The Court also stated that "truthful"' does
not Ineanihat 'cerv ttt is trit for probalble cause may he foinded upon infirmation receivcd from
illirtaits. Id. Thus tit Cott may I) indicating that in informant's mistepresentatiot may" not
violat t tearrant requirent. Secanto Rugendorif'. United States. 376 U.S. .528 (1964). in wvhich
the Court stated that alleged falsities by informants in the search warrant affidavit "were of only
peripheral rcli\axn
itt lthcsh'ig if pli
cause. and. not being within rit personal knowledg
oftie afliant. did not go ito the integrits ,fithe affidavit. " Id. at 532.
53. __
U.S. at __
98 S. C. at 2684. The Court stated that "we need not decide and we in
io \\i\
pltedrlettnine, lIlte difficll question wxhether a revies ing court lliust ever require rilt
rex clat o off tltc identity of, atl informant onie a substantial prelimtinary sht , ing of falsity tas betn
nItade." Id It appears tle Court r1ax hie indicating that a threshoM requliremn nt to dist-losure \-oil
Ile a "sulstantial irelininary shoiing of falsil\'. " Presittiablh that showing i-otil(
be cquivahnt to
the showing required tt mandate a veracity challenge hearing.
5. Id
55. MCra v. Illinotis. 386 U.S. :300 (19(i7).
56. Thc lat that tihe defetndat's Iurden of pro ing ti' fialsilv wsill usualh" le very diff i lht tl
Ititer. anid iften itiptssibh., it lt Cannot irtss.- ,t l
-titl
rite atliant's infor tant,
taytllanatt '
dischmsti
in soii
cases. Otherwise
il decision in Frans"would likely have little' practical
allplcalim
<n d,'
crrn ffect in ,'ascs in which unnanwid intforlmants suplplit-d (Ile information relied
5 7.. - V.S . . . 98 S. C. 2t67-1.
. M. at_
. 98 S. Cr. in 2(83.

